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District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Robert Lassiter appeals the District Court’s grant of 
defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings under 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
 
I.  Background 
On May 25, 2011, Lassiter filed a complaint alleging, 
inter alia, Fourth Amendment violations for excessive force 
and false arrest.  The complaint stated that the incident giving 
rise to Lassiter’s cause of action took place on May 22, 2009.  
On August 2, 2011, defendants filed an answer asserting six 
affirmative defenses.  However, defendants did not raise the 
two-year statute of limitations as a defense.   
 
The parties appeared before the District Court for a 
Rule 16 pretrial conference on September 20, 2011.  During 
the conference, without being prompted by either party, the 
District Court observed that the statute of limitations 
appeared to have expired but that defendants failed to raise 
the issue in their answer.  Defendants’ counsel acknowledged 
that they had missed this issue.  The District Court then 
suggested that defendants could amend their answer and, in a 
scheduling order, invited defendants to advise the court as to 
“how this matter should proceed.” 
 
After the pretrial conference, defendants sought leave 
to file an amended answer.   On February 23, 2012,  the 
District Court granted the motion over Lassiter’s opposition.  
Defendants then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
seeking dismissal of the complaint due to the expiration of the 
statute of limitations.  On May 29, 2012, the District Court 
granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings 
and dismissed the complaint as time barred.  Lassiter 
appealed. 
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II.  Discussion
1
 
Lassiter raises three issues on appeal.  First, he argues 
that the District Court improperly raised the statute of 
limitations issue sua sponte at the Rule 16 conference.  His 
second claim of error is that, because the statute of limitations 
issue was raised improperly, the District Court erroneously 
granted defendants leave to file the amended answer.  Third, 
Lassiter posits that, given these two errors, the District Court 
should not have granted defendants’ motion for judgment on 
the pleadings.  Because we hold that the District Court had 
the authority to raise the statute of limitations issue during the 
Rule 16 conference, we need not address Lassiter’s second 
and third arguments. 
 
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
contemplates that a trial court should assume an “active 
managerial role” in the litigation process to expedite the 
efficient disposition of a case.  Phillips v. Allegheny Cnty., 
869 F.2d 234, 239 (3d Cir. 1989).  At a Rule 16 conference, a 
district court “may consider and take appropriate action” on a 
broad variety of topics, including “formulating and 
simplifying the issues, and eliminating frivolous claims or 
defenses[.]”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(A).  Indeed, the notes to 
Rule 16(c) state that the rule was drafted to “clarify and 
                                              
1
 Questions of law—including the scope of a district court’s 
authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—are 
subject to plenary review.  Pfizer Inc. v. Uprichard, 422 F.3d 
124, 129 (3d Cir. 2005).  The District Court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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confirm the court’s power to identify the litigable issues . . . in 
the hope of promoting efficiency and conserving judicial 
resources by identifying the real issues prior to trial, thereby 
saving time and expense for everyone.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 
Advisory Comm. Notes to 1983 Amendment, Subdivision (c) 
(emphasis added) (citing Meadow Gold Prods. Co v. Wright, 
278 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).   
 
Consistent with the text and the Advisory Committee 
Notes, we have interpreted Rule 16 as vesting a trial court 
with “wide discretion and power to advance causes and 
simplify procedure before presentation of cases to juries.”  
Buffington v. Wood, 351 F.2d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 1965).  Thus, 
Rule 16 authorizes a trial judge to “supervise the pretrial 
phase of litigation . . . [by] sifting the issues and reducing the 
delays and expense of trial so that a suit will go to trial only 
on questions as to which there is an honest dispute of fact or 
law.”  Delta Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 398 
F.2d 323, 324 (5th Cir. 1968) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Brinn v. Bull Insular Lines, Inc., 28 
F.R.D. 578, 579 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (affirming the district court’s 
limitation of theories upon which the plaintiff could seek 
liability during a Rule 16 conference).   
 
Here, the District Court acted within the scope of its 
authority by raising the statute of limitations issue—an 
important issue on which there was no dispute of fact or 
law—at an early stage (less than two months after the answer 
was filed) to prevent the needless waste of judicial resources.  
Because defendants could have amended the answer to 
include the statute of limitations defense and because the 
untimeliness of the complaint was obvious, it would have 
been pointless for the District Court to allow this case to 
6 
continue to occupy space on the docket.
2
  The prompt 
identification and efficient resolution of simple issues like the 
one at bar today is precisely the reason why Rule 16 exists.  
Therefore, we conclude that the District Court did not err in 
raising the statute of limitations issue at the Rule 16 
conference and in inviting the parties to brief the issue. 
 
Lassiter relies heavily on two cases from other circuits 
for the proposition that a district court may not raise a statute 
of limitations defense sua sponte.  See Eriline Co. S.A. v. 
Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655-57 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 
district court should have refrained from raising and 
considering the statute of limitations defense sua sponte.”); 
Haskell v. Wash. Twp., 864 F.2d 1266, 1273 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(“Since it is a waivable defense, it ordinarily is error for a 
district court to raise the [statute of limitations] sua sponte.”).  
These cases are inapposite.  In both cases, the parties had 
engaged in protracted litigation before the trial judges raised 
the statute of limitations issue.  See Eriline, 440 F.3d at 650-
51 (eighteen months); Haskell, 894 F.2d at 1273 (three years).  
                                              
2
 As noted by the District Court, defendants did not waive the 
statute of limitations defense at the time of the Rule 16 
conference because the answer could still have been amended 
to include a statue of limitations defense.  See Charpentier v. 
Godsil, 937 F.2d 859, 863-64 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
failure to raise an affirmative defense in an answer does not 
automatically result in waiver, and that the defense may be 
asserted in an amended pleading, so long as the plaintiff 
suffers no prejudice); see also Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 
128, 135 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that defendants should 
be afforded broad latitude to amend an answer to assert a 
statute of limitations defense).   
7 
Because of the length of time and extensive litigation in those 
cases, the courts determined that the statute of limitations 
defense had been waived under Rule 8(c); consequently, it 
was improper for the district courts to have raised the statute 
of limitations question sua sponte.  See Eriline, 440 F.3d at 
653-54; Haskell, 864 F.2d at 1273.  Furthermore, in both 
cases, the district court not only raised the statute of 
limitations defense, it also issued a sua sponte ruling on it.  
See Eriline, 440 F.3d at 651 (sua sponte dismissal of “the 
Complaint in its entirety”); Haskell, 864 F.2d at 1272 (sua 
sponte grant of leave to file an amended answer).  Here, 
although the District Court raised the statute of limitations 
problem during the Rule 16 conference, it acted only in 
response to appropriate motions by the defendant.  In light of 
these distinctions, we find Eriline and Haskell to be 
unpersuasive. 
 
Lassiter also argues that, in raising the statute of 
limitations issue sua sponte, the District Court upset the 
principle of parity and the purpose of the adversarial system 
by essentially acting as counsel for defendants.  This concern 
is overblown.  First of all, we question whether the District 
Court’s act of calling attention to the statute of limitations can 
be properly characterized as raising that defense sua sponte, 
given that the Court then waited for defendants to raise it—
and for Lassiter to respond to it—before ruling on the issue.  
In any event, our precedent suggests that a district court is 
well within its rights to independently raise a statute of 
limitations defense in such a manner.  We have concluded 
that “a district court may sua sponte raise the issue of the 
deficiency of a complaint . . .  so long as the plaintiff is 
accorded an opportunity to respond.”  Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238, 256 n.14 (3d Cir. 2010) 
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(discussing defenses to a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  For example, 
in a pretrial conference just three weeks before trial, we have 
approved of a district court sua sponte raising an affirmative 
defense that otherwise might have been waived.  Pediatrix 
Screening, Inc. v. Telechem Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 541, 544, 550 
(3d Cir. 2010).  We have also held that judges have the power 
to sua sponte raise equitable defenses like the doctrine of 
unclean hands.  Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 
276 F.3d 160, 174 (3d Cir. 2001).  These cases confirm that it 
was plainly within the power of the District Court here to 
raise the statute of limitations defense on its own initiative 
during the first pretrial conference.   
 
In sum, because the District Court has broad pretrial 
management authority under Rule 16 and because Lassiter 
was given the opportunity to respond to the issue presented, 
we reject Lassiter’s contention that the District Court 
improperly raised its concern about the statute of limitations 
during the initial pretrial conference.
3
 
 
III.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                              
3
 Because we hold that the District Court had the authority to 
raise the statute of limitations issue during the Rule 16 
conference, Lassiter’s subsidiary arguments that the District 
Court should not have granted leave to amend and that the 
District Court should not have considered the statute of 
limitations issue in defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion necessarily 
fail. 
